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Independent Agencies in the United States:
The Responsibility of
Public Lawyers
By Marshall J. Breger
and Gary J. Edles
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I

ndependent federal agencies occupy a special constitutional position in the governmental structure. Their stock-in-trade is the
expert, apolitical resolution of regulatory issues. They are supposedly “independent” of the political will of the executive branch.
Because most are multi-member organizations, they are also perceived as accommodating diverse views and able to prevent extreme
outcomes through the compromise inherent in the process of collegial
decision-making. But such a view is not universally held. A wellknown examination of such agencies in the 1930s described them
uncharitably as a “headless ‘fourth branch’ of government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers.”1
Most modern independent agencies, in fact, are not simply
impartial government referees. Nonetheless, as Justice Breyer has
suggested, they possess “comparative freedom from ballot box control”2 and “enjoy an independence expressly designed to insulate
them, to a degree, from the ‘exercise of political oversight . . .’” that
affects cabinet or cabinetlike executive agencies.3 So, precisely what
is the place of independent agencies today, and what does their role
in the governmental structure mean for public lawyers?
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The Advent of Federal
Independent Agencies and
Railroad Regulation in Britain
The modern independent agency at
the federal level emerged in 1887 when
Congress established the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). But the
ICC had its forebearers. Britain examined railroad regulation as early as
the 1830s, in response to shipper complaints about monopoly practices.
The British Railway Regulation Bill
of 1840 attempted to delegate power
over railways to a government department, the Board of Trade, but it was an
ineffectual statute. It required railways
to give the Board of Trade notice before
opening a new line, but the board
lacked power to prevent operation.
The board could also entertain complaints but, signiicantly, lacked power
to pursue them. For the next 32 years,
Parliament tried unsuccessfully to regulate the railroad industry.
In 1872, yet another parliamentary
committee reviewed over 30 years of
British rail regulation. It once again
concluded that marketplace competition was unsuccessful. As to how to
remedy this situation, the committee
reviewed several options. It believed
that judicial enforcement of competition statutes was too expensive and
that the courts, in any event, lacked
expertise in railway matters. Direct
oversight by parliamentary committees was likewise seen as ineffective.
Finally, the committee believed that
oversight by a cabinet department, i.e.,
the Board of Trade, lacked the procedural protections of the judicial model.
So, to some extent as a default position, the committee recommended
creation of a tribunal to supervise the
railways, with authority to hear complaints from customers and provide
remedies, and otherwise enforce laws
relating to the railways. Composed of
at least three members, the new commission would include “an eminent
lawyer” and another “acquainted
with railway management.”4 Parliament created the new commission on
a temporary basis in 1872 and made
it permanent in 1888 — nearly a halfcentury after regulatory efforts began.
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U.S. Railroad Regulation
Railroad regulation emerged in the
United States shortly after British regulation. The impetus for government
oversight was the brainchild of Charles
Francis Adams Jr. Between 1866 and
1878, he wrote several inluential articles about the economics of railroad
operation, including Chapters of Erie,
and Other Essays, a muckraking book
coauthored with his brother Henry.
They argued that the railroads, if
unsupervised, would become natural
monopolies but that government operation of railroads or regulation would
stile eficiency and innovation. Their
remedy was creation of a so-called
sunshine commission, i.e., an impartial
body of experts that would investigate, examine and report on railroad
activities, but not have enforcement
power.5 Some states adopted this format, including Massachusetts, where
Adams served as one of its irst three
commissioners. Other states set up
commissions with signiicant powers. The irst was the Illinois Railroad
and Warehouse Commission, established in 1871. By 1886, a year before
the creation of the ICC, 30 of the 38
states then in existence had some form
of railroad regulation, and 25 used the
commission form.
Congress was well aware of the
experience of both the British and the
individual states. The statute creating
the ICC6 intended to create a commission with a degree of expertise and
independence. Commissioners were
appointed by the president with the
advice and consent of the Senate, and
they served staggered terms that were
longer than that of the president. Commissioners were somewhat insulated
from direct presidential supervision
by the act’s removal provision for
“ineficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in ofice,” a core element of
numerous independent agency statutes today. One scholar points out that
initial appointments to the ICC came
mostly from the public sector rather
than the railroad industry, in an effort
to limit industry control.7 Another
scholar argues that, nonetheless, those
appointed were plainly sympathetic to
the railroads.8

With little discretionary power at
the outset, the ICC was weak and
ineffectual until Congress passed the
Hepburn Act in 1906,9 which gave the
ICC rate-making authority. The passage of the Hepburn Act was part of
the Progressive Movement. In the view
of Progressives, it was essential for
expert administrators with technical
competence in the various areas of regulation to staff independent regulatory
commissions.

Appointments: Industry
Representatives Versus Neutrals
Since the Progressive Era, a range of
factors other than expertise has inluenced appointments to independent
agencies. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is an illustration.
The Wagner Act created the NLRB
as a statutory agency in 1935.10 The
board had three members.11 President Roosevelt appointed as its irst
three members the following: J. Warren Madden, chair, a Professor at the
University of Pittsburgh School of
Law; John M. Carmody, a federal government oficial; and Edwin S. Smith,
a former commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Labor and
Industries. Some members of Congress wanted a board independent of
political control, while others preferred
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a board composed of representatives
of industry and labor. Congress eventually created a board that remained
essentially neutral for 18 years, with
members coming largely from academia or government. In 1952,
however, President Eisenhower — the
irst Republican elected since passage of the Wagner Act — appointed
management-oriented members to the
board. Starting with President Nixon
in 1970, members have been chosen
largely for their management or union
backgrounds.
By the 1960s, the “theoretical underpinnings of administrative expertise
had been largely undermined.”12
The administrative process was
increasingly seen less as a forum for
ascertaining the public interest and
more as a forum for interest representation. As Harvard law professor Mark
Tushnet explained, “[i]nterest-group
bargaining — a form of politics — was
relocated into administrative agencies,
and the Progressive claim that administrative agencies pursued science
rather than politics became dificult to
sustain.”13

The Inluence of the President
and Congress
Independent agencies today undertake
signiicant regulatory and administrative roles within a broader tug and
tussle of interbranch tension. The
president’s constitutional appointment
and removal powers have been limited by Congress, with approval from
the Supreme Court.14 Nonetheless, the
president retains considerable power
over agency membership — and,
hence, inluence over agency policy
direction under highly discretionary
statutes — through his appointment
(and re-appointment) power, especially the selection of agency chairs,
who are almost always the agency’s
most signiicant members. And, bolstered largely by custom, the president
even retains inluence in prodding
unwanted independent agency members from ofice.
Congress likewise holds signiicant powers. As a bipartisan group of
senators and congressmen reminded
President Carter in 1977, “Congress,

16
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and not the executive, controls the
guidelines for independent regulatory agencies. Congress created these
agencies. Congress provided for their
organization. Congress adopted their
statutory mandates. Congress controls
their budgets and oversees their performance. Congress speciies agency
procedures.”15 Indeed, some today
think that Congress, perhaps more
than the president, is now the primary inluence on most independent
agencies.

Agency Independence and the
Consumer Finance Protection
Bureau
A wide variety of hypotheses about
agency independence exists. But
practical rather than theoretical considerations motivated the creation of the
irst independent agency, the ICC, and
practical considerations continue to
dominate the structure and functioning of independent agencies.
Creation of the Consumer Finance
Protection Bureau by the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 is a recent
illustration.16
Harvard law professor Elizabeth
Warren introduced in a 2007 article
the idea of an agency that would regulate consumer inancial products.17
She argued that a model based on the
multi-member Consumer Product
Safety Commission, which had protected consumers from purchasing
defective or dangerous goods through
uniform safety standards and regulation, would be just as useful in the
inancial products market. In 2009,
Chairman Barney Frank of the House
Financial Services Committee introduced legislation that would set up a
typical ive-member independent regulatory commission.18 Later that year,
he tried again with legislation that
retained the independent commission
concept but provided, signiicantly,
that the new agency would be funded
through the Federal Reserve Board.
He proposed that 10 percent of the
federal government’s budget go automatically to the new agency every
year, thus depriving both Congress
and the administration of their usual

appropriations oversight powers.19
In the Senate, Chairman Christopher
Dodd of the Senate Banking Committee introduced in 2010 his version of
inancial protection legislation, which
differed in certain respects from the
House version. Dodd proposed an
agency headed by a single director
appointed to a ive-year term with the
usual statutory removal protection.
But the agency would be a bureau
of the Federal Reserve Board funded
through the Federal Reserve System.
To ensure the new bureau’s independence, the Federal Reserve was
statutorily prohibited from exercising any control over it.20 The bureau’s
only connection to the federal government is the funding mechanism.
President Obama signed the DoddFrank bill into law in 2010.21
Republicans were concerned that
they would lose important political
inluence over the new agency if it had
only a single individual at its head
and a genuinely autonomous revenue
stream. A key conceptual objection to
the new agency was its lack of democratic accountability. The legislation
creating it was described as an effort to
“hyperdepoliticize” the agency.22
Although it seems that the text of
Dodd-Frank sought to insulate the
new bureau from politics, this does not
mean that the president or Congress
lacks ways of inluencing the bureau’s
regulatory and enforcement activity. The president’s inluence comes
from his ability to nominate a single
director to a ive-year term. However, this inluence can be thwarted
by Congress. As an extreme response,
a hostile Congress, especially if supported by a new administration, can
revise the agency’s statutory mandate
or even abolish the agency entirely.23
More likely, the Senate, through its
conirmation authority, can delay,
if not defeat, a president’s choice of
director. Indeed, that happened with
Senate approval of the bureau’s irst
director. President Obama nominated former Ohio Attorney General
Richard Cordray in July 2011, but
Republican efforts to alter the agency’s structure by replacing the director
with a multi-member board initially
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stiled Cordray’s approval. President
Obama skirted Republican objection
by giving Cordray a recess appointment. NLRB v. Noel Canning declared
such recess appointments illegal (President Obama also made three to the
National Labor Relations Board).24 It
took two years before Cordray was
conirmed as part of a package deal in
which Republicans agreed to vote on
Cordray’s nomination, and that of two
NLRB members, in exchange for President Obama’s agreement to withdraw
two additional recess appointments to
the NLRB.25

Conlicting Constitutional
Theories of Independent
Agencies
The constitutionality of the independent agency was not an issue
of considerable debate until many
decades after establishment of the
ICC. Now, two conlicting constitutional theories compete for dominance.
Some observers believe that independent agencies must be considered as
part of a unitary executive supervised
at the top by the president. The president, after all, must constitutionally
“take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”26 The argument suggests
that this duty can be discharged only
if agencies performing executive functions are understood to be agents of
the president and responsible to him.
Any other structure would undermine
accountability. Others argue for permeability among the branches. They
claim that Congress may, by statute,
adjust or alter a strict tripartite division
of federal power as long as it does not
undermine a core function of another
branch or “alter the balance of authority” among the branches.27 Supreme
Court decisions have not consistently
applied a particular approach or theory. Rather, they apply a literal or
functional approach depending on
circumstances.
Professor Colin Diver suggests that
“the history of the administrative state
is an unending contest between Congress and the President for control
of the bureaucracy.”28 Public lawyers must operate in this environment
that melds the conlicting goals of
T H E PU B L I C L A W Y E R

political accountability and independent expertise. Government lawyers
must continue the historic tradition
of acquiring and retaining expertise
based on long service and experience and bring that expertise to bear
unencumbered by partisan or personal bias. At the same time, absent
unusual circumstances, public lawyers
must remain faithful to the elected or
appointed policy makers who, by virtue of their election or appointment,
are accountable to the public and
thus possess legitimacy in our constitutional system. Maintaining that
balance can be dificult in a regulatory
regime governed by statutory texts
that are often ambiguous and that can
be read literally or in historical context.
Upholding that balance is the responsibility of the public lawyer. n
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